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supplementary references to sources which are more accessible than those cited in the original; for American periodical literature and American writers in general have been given the scantiest possible recognition. Nevertheless the translator has deemed it wisest to leave Wundt's selected lists unchanged, on the ground, no doubt, that these should fully represent the author's estimates of existing literature upon the topics treated.

On the whole, one has only words of praise for this volume as it now stands in its third English dress, and Professor Judd is to be warmly commended for the skill and pains with which he has executed his task.

A. H. PIERCE.

SMITH COLLEGE.

Philosophical Problems in the Light of Vital Organization. By EDMUND MONTGOMERY. New York and London, G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1907.—pp. 462.

In philosophy, as in life, a worthy intention often fails to embody itself in an adequate performance. And of the truth of this statement Mr. Montgomery's book is an excellent illustration.

The author's intention is to illumine the dark fields of metaphysic with the search-light of science, and to bridge the chasms discovered therein by means of the principles of vital organization; his performance consists in propounding a dualistic realism of the type made classic by Locke's distinction between secondary qualities and their primary substratum,—a theory which, if true, would turn the search-light of science into a useless toy and would consign the principles of vital organization to the limbo of the unknowable. The volume is, indeed, a belated representative of the form of realism so annihilatingly criticised in T. H. Green's classic introduction to Locke, Berkeley, and Hume.

Two movements are to be discovered in Mr. Montgomery's argument,—the one critical, the other constructive. In the critical movement, the author exposes, clearly and tersely, the antinomies which have arisen in connection with quantity and quality, substance and accident, identity and difference, permanence and change, causation, universal and particular, subject and object. The discussions are suggestive and constitute by far the most forceful portion of the argument.

The constructive treatment, which is painfully repetitious and long drawn out, centres in the well-known realistic fallacy of dividing the cosmos of experience into two mutually exclusive portions. On the one side, are the 'subjective' states of consciousness; on the other, is the 'objective' extra-conscious world of things and persons united somehow into a system. The states of consciousness are fragmentary, evanescent, unsubstantial, sheerly fluent; the extra-conscious world is complete, permanent, identical, solid, dynamic. The true relation of the two spheres is this: in conscious states alone is there any awareness and knowledge of reality; in the extra-mental world is to be found the real basis from which the

evanescent conscious states proceed and in which the definite orderliness of their connected appearances latently consists. This, we see, is Locke's contrast of the conscious qualities and the extra-mental substratum all over again.

Mr. Montgomery spends much time in repetitiously demolishing Idealism, which he thoroughly misunderstands, and in warning the reader against Materialism, to which, nevertheless, his own argument pretty definitely leads. Were he able to follow the suggestions thrown out by his own analysis, in which he here and there naïvely admits that the conscious medium contains all values, he would have saved himself the trouble of knocking down men of straw. He would also have had an opportunity to understand Objective Idealism and to avoid the leap in the dark which he finally makes. For, having convinced himself that nothing is revealed except in consciousness, and that consciousness is utterly phenomenal and evanescent, he advances the profound argument that, unless we are willing to admit that we are fools, both as common-sense individuals and as scientists, we must admit that there is an extra-conscious world of real substantial being. Here again we have Locke. It would have been open to Mr. Montgomery either to adopt the position of Hume, or to work over to an Objective Idealistic basis, or to endeavor to operate the impossible conception of a something or another, one knows not what, which subtends evanescent conscious states. But to posit an extra-conscious reality, and then to interpret it in conscious terms as he must and does to make science 'objective,' is to play too fast and loose altogether.

Nevertheless, despite the impossibility of uniting an extra-conscious realism with an all-revealing ephemeral consciousness, Mr. Montgomery has propounded a very suggestive view-point in his contention that vital function presents analogies which are of fundamental value in the treatment of the old paradoxes of the Many and the One, etc. This he limits too narrowly, indeed, to the ordinary biological or sub-human organization. Withal, however, it is suggestive, as Royce, James, and Taylor among others have recently shown. Such a position, however, will never receive due recognition until it has freed itself from the limits of Realism, whether Transfigured or Ideal-Real, and until it has wrought itself upon a basis which is objectively Idealistic, into a theory which is essentially Humanistic, and by means of a methodology which is concretely and individually teleological, *i. e.*, Pragmatic.

S. F. MACLENNAN.

OBERLIN COLLEGE.

The following books also have been received :

Nietzsche in Outline and Aphorism. By A. R. ORAGE. Edinburgh and London, T. N. Foulis, 1907. — pp. viii, 188.

The Will to Doubt: An Essay in Philosophy for the General Thinker. By ALFRED H. LLOYD. London, Swan Sonnenschein & Co., Lim., 1907. — pp. xi, 285. 4s. 6d.